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"I SIMPLY DO NOT BELIEVE...":
A CASE STUDY OF CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS IN CANADIAN REFUGEE
ADJUDICATION
*Sean Rehaag

I.

INTRODUCTION

Refugee determinations often turn on a single question: Is the refugee claimant telling the
truth? While there are other factors that refugee adjudicators must consider, determining whether
the claimant's story is credible remains central to virtually all refugee hearings. In light of the
key role credibility assessments play in refugee determinations, scholars are paying increasingly
more attention to how refugee adjudicators assess credibility.
This article contributes to the growing body of research on this subject by examining the
full caseload of one refugee adjudicator at Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) over
a three-year period. That adjudicator, David McBean, denied all the applications for refugee
protection he heard during the first three years of his tenure on the IRB. This article examines
McBean's decision-making during this period as a case study to shed light on credibility
assessments in Canada's refugee determination process. The case study draws on quantitative
and qualitative data obtained from the IRB using access to information requests. While McBean
is, as the study demonstrates, an outlier in terms of the frequency with which he denies refugee
applications, his reasoning with regard to credibility is nonetheless instructive.
The article begins by describing the role of credibility in Canada's refugee determination
process, including a discussion of existing scholarship in the area. Next, the article presents the
case study, offering a quantitative and qualitative examination of McBean's refugee
determinations from 2008 to 2010, with a focus on how he approaches credibility assessments.
The article then considers three sets of implications of the case study and ends with a brief
conclusion.
II.

CONTEXT: CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS
a. Credibility in Canada's Refugee Determination Process

Canada's refugee determination system was revised in 2012.1 Because this article
involves a case study of refugee determinations made from 2008 to 2010, this section will
describe the process that was in place at the time, noting where there are differences under the
revised system.
Under both the prior and revised refugee determination systems, the process begins when
a person makes a refugee claim to an immigration officer, either at a port of entry or at an
*Sean Rehaag is an Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. He holds an SJD from the University of
Toronto, a LLB & BCL from McGill and a BA(Hon) from the University of British Columbia.
1 BalancedRefugee Reform Act, SC 2010, c 8 [BRRA]; ProtectingCanada'sImmigrationSystem Act, SC 2012, c 17
[PCISA]; See Lome Waldman & Jacqueline Swaisland, Canada'sRefugee DeterminationProcedure:A Guide for
the Post Bill C-31 Era (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2013).
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immigration office.2 The officer interviews the claimant to determine whether the claim is
eligible to be referred to the IRB's Refugee Protection Division (RPD). 3
Where claims are referred to the RPD, the claimant must submit documentation,
including a Personal Information Form (PIF) under the prior system, 4 or a Basis of Claim form
under the new system.- These forms include biographical information and the claimant's account
of the persecution feared in their home country (often called a "narrative"). In addition, claimants
must submit supporting documents.6 These typically include information related to the claimant
(e.g. identity documents, medical reports, police reports, etc.) and information related to
conditions in the claimant's country of origin (e.g. reports by media and human nights
organizations).' Other documents, such as IRB country condition national documentation
packages and notes taken by immigration officers at the eligibility stage are usually also added to
the record by the RPD.'
Since 1985, refugee claimants in Canada have, as a matter of constitutional law, been
entitled to an oral hearing, where they can present their case and respond to any case against
them. 9 At these hearings, the claimant's testimony and the documents on the record are the key
evidence considered.o RPD hearings are conducted by specialized quasi-judicial administrative
decision-makers, known as RPD Members," who are tasked with determining whether claimants
meet the refugee definition, as set out in Canada's immigration legislation.1 2 Hearings are, in
most circumstances, meant to be non-adversarial. 13
One of the main purposes of the oral hearing is to facilitate credibility assessments, that is
to say, to determine whether the claimant's account of feared persecution is genuine.14 Although
it is possible to obtain refugee protection notwithstanding negative credibility findings, this is
rare.- In most cases, if the RPD disbelieves the claimant's story, the claim fails. However, it is
not uncommon for the RPD to believe a claimant's story and yet still refuse refugee protection
2 Immigration andRefugee

ProtectionAct, SC 2001, c 27, s 99(3) [IRPA].
100-102.
Refugee ProtectionDivision Rules, SOR/2002-228, ss 5-6, Schedule I [PriorRPD Rules].
Refugee ProtectionDivision Rules, SOR/2002-256, ss 6-7 [RPD Rules].
6 PriorRPDRules, supra note 4, s 7; RPD Rules, supra note 5, s 11.
Martin Jones & Sasha Baglay, Refugee Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 231-232.
PriorRPD Rules, supra note 4, s 29 (Any such documents that the RPD wants to rely upon must be disclosed in
3 Ibid, ss

advance to the claimant); RPD Rules, supra note 5, ss 33-34; "National Documentation Packages", Immigrationand
Refugee Boardof Canada(1 October 2015), online:
<www.irb-cisr.gc.ca>.
9 Singh v Canada (Ministerof Employment andImmigration), [1985] 1 SCR 177 at paras 57-58, 17 DLR (4th) 422
[Singh].
10 Jones & Baglay, supranote 7 at 98 & 241.
11 IRPA, supra note 2, s 153(under the prior system, RPD Members were Governor in Council appointees serving
for fixed terms during good behavior); IRPA, supra note 2 (as amended by BRRA, supra note 1) (under the new
system, RPD Members are no longer Governor in Council appointees -- thus they are simply regular civil servants)
12 IRPA, supranote 2, ss 96-98, 169.1-170.2.
13 Immigration and Refugee Board, "Weighing Evidence" (31 December 2013) at 3-1, online: <www.irb-cisr.gc.ca>
(the exception is where an issue arises as to exclusion from the refugee definition or where the Minister participates
in the proceedings) [IRB, "Evidence"].
14 Jones & Baglay, supra note 7 at 241; Donald Galloway & Jamie Liew, Immigration Law, 2nd ed (Toronto, Irwin
Law, 2015) at 31; See also Singh, supra note 9 at para 59 (holding that where credibility is involved, claimants are
entitled to an oral hearing).
1See e.g. Canada (citizenship and Immigration) v Sellan, 2008 FCA 381 at para 3, 384 NR 163 (the RPD may
disbelieve a claimant's entire story, but nonetheless find based on objective evidence that the claimant belongs to a
group that faces a risk of persecution).
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on the basis that the claim does not meet an aspect of the refugee definition.16 While credibility is
not, therefore, necessarily determinative, it is nonetheless often a central issue. In fact, according
to case law, credibility is always at issue in refugee hearings."
b. How Credibility Decisions are made at the RPD
Credibility determinations are factual findings." As with other types of factual findings in
immigration proceedings, RPD Members have a great deal of flexibility in how they make these
findings.1 9 For example, there are no formal rules of evidence,20 and courts are generally
deferential towards RPD assessments of evidence on judicial review.21 Nevertheless, several
principles governing credibility assessments can be found in the case law.
According to case law, claimants bear the burden of proof with regard to factual
findings,2 2 and the civil standard (i.e. balance of probabilities) is the applicable standard of
proof.23 At the same time, however, claimants benefit from a presumption of truthfulness, which
means that the claimant's sworn evidence is assumed to be true unless there is a good reason to
think otherwise.2 4 Thus, if RPD members disbelieve claimants they must offer clear explanations
as to why.2 5 In evaluating these explanations, courts have held that a lack of corroborating
evidence is not, on its own, sufficient to justify negative credibility inferences.2 6 Courts have also
indicated that sworn evidence cannot be disbelieved merely on the basis that it is self-serving.27
Credibility findings are often based on a variety of factors. For example, the RPD
frequently draws negative credibility inferences from unexplained inconsistencies or omissions
in the claimant's evidence, such as internal discrepancies between the claimant's testimony, the
claimant's narrative, and information collected from the claimant by immigration officers.2 8 The
RPD also often draws negative credibility inferences where the claimant's evidence is
16
17

See e.g. CanadianDoctorsfor Refugee Care v Canada (AG), 2014 FC 651 at paras 842-848, 28 Imm LR (4th) 1.
See e.g. Ayimadu-Antwi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] FCJ No 1116 at para 7, 57

ACWS (3d) 332..
18 Lin v Canada(Minister of Citizenshipand Immigration), [2008] FC 1052 at para 13, 170 ACWS (3d) 399 [Lin];
Camara v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2008 FC 362 at para 12, 167 ACWS (3d) 158
[Camara].
19 Jones & Baglay, supranote 7 at 240.
20 IRPA, supranote 2, s 170.
21 Lin, supra note 18 at para 13; Ortiz Garzon v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 299 at para 24, 199 ACWS (3d) 563;
Camara, supranote 18 at para 12; see also FederalCourtsAct, RSC 1985, c F-7, s 18.1(4)(d).
22 Alam v Canada (MCI), 2005 FC 4 at para 5, 41 Imm LR (3d) 263 [Alam]. See also, IRB, "Evidence", supra note
13 at 7-1-7-3. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, "Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees" (January 1992) at para 196, online: www.unhcr.org/4d93528a9.pdf [UNHCR].
23 Alam, supra note 22, at para 8 (note that the standard of proof for factual findings is not the same thing as the
level of risk that must be shown under the refugee definition) (i.e. serious possibility or reasonable grounds)); see
also IRB, "Evidence", supra note 13 at 3-8.
24 Immigration and Refugee Board, "Assessment of Credibility in Claims for Refugee Protection" (31 January 2004)
at paras 3, 52-53, online: <http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/references/LegJur/Documents/Credibe.pdf>
[IRB, "Credibility"]; UNHCR, supranote 22.
25 IRB, "Credibility", supra note
24 at 20-22.
26 Sadeghi-Pariv Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2004 FC 282 at paras 21, 37-38, Imm LR (3d)
150; OrtegaAyala v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2011 FC 611 at paras 20-21, 202 ACWS
(3d) 561; see also, IRB, "Credibility", supra note 24 at 54-55.
27 IRB, "Credibility", supra
note 24 at 67.
28 IRB, "Credibility", supra note
24 at 23-32.
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inconsistent with country conditions information or other documents.2 9 Whether the identified
inconsistencies are intrinsic or extrinsic, the RPD has been cautioned against engaging in overvigilant or microscopic analyses of trivial or minor inconsistencies.3 0 The RPD also often makes
negative credibility findings based on plausibility. That having been said, courts require that
RPD Members offer more than just their subjective impressions of plausibility by requiring them
to point to reliable and verifiable evidence against which the claimant's evidence can be tested.31
Another ground the RPD frequently relies upon when making credibility determinations is the
demeanour or manner in which the claimant testifies, such as where the claimant's testimony is
vague or hesitant. Generally speaking, though, courts prefer that credibility determinations not
rely exclusively on claimant demeanour.3 2
In addition to finding that specific factual assertions are not credible, the RPD can make
general negative credibility findings. This is an overall finding that the claimant's evidence is not
credible. The RPD can make these findings without holding that every single aspect of the
claimant's evidence is untrue as long as the claimant is sufficiently lacking credibility such that
the RPD reasonably disbelieves the totality of the evidence. The consequence of general negative
credibility findings is that the claimant's testimony is rejected, though the RPD must still
consider any objective evidence that is untainted by the credibility finding.3 3
Also, where the RPD is of the view that "there was no credible or trustworthy evidence
on which it could have made a favourable decision," the RPD must make a no credible basis
(NCB) declaration.3 4 Such declarations limit the procedural rights available to claimants after the
negative refugee determination. 3 5 It is important to emphasize that NCB declarations and general
negative credibility determinations are distinct. Courts have held that the threshold for NCB
declarations is high and that the RPD should not routinely make such declarations merely
because it concludes that claimants are not credible. 36 Instead, NCB declarations are restricted to
scenarios where there is not any trustworthy or credible evidence-whether in the claimant's
evidence or country condition evidence-that could possibly support a positive decision. 37

29
30

Ibid at 79-81.
Ibid at 85-86.

Monteiro v Canada (MCI), 2002 FCT 1258 (CanLIl) at paras 14-15, [2002] FCJ No 1720 (QL); Yu v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 167 at para 10, [2015] FCJ No 138 (QL); see also, IRB, "Credibility",
supranote 24 at 33-37.
32 Rahal v Canada (Ministerof Citizenship & Immigration), 2012 FC 319 (CanLlI) at para 44, [2012] FCJ No 369
31

(QL); Gjergo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2004 FC 303 at para 22, 131 ACWS (3d) 508;
Aguilar Zacariasv Canada(Ministerof Citizenship& Immigration), 2012 FC 1155 at para 24, [2012] FCJ No 1252

(QL); see also, IRB, "Credibility", supranote 24 at 38-40.
33 Sheikh v Canada (MEI) [1990] 3 FCR 238 at paras 7-8, 71 DLR (4th) 604; see also, IRB, "Credibility", supra

note 24 at 16.
34 IRPA, supra note 2, s 107(2) (note that under Canada's new refugee determination system there is an additional
procedure for declaring claims to be "manifestly unfounded" where claims are "clearly fraudulent"); see IRPA,
supra note 2, s 107.1 (the test for the latter, and the distinction between NCB claims and manifestly unfounded
claims has not yet been established in the case law).
35 See ibid, s 110(2)(c) (For example, in the new system, NCB declarations prevent claimants from appealing to the
IRB's Refugee Appeal Division); Immigration and Refugee ProtectionRegulations, SOR/2002-227, s 231 (Under

both the new system and prior systems, claimants whose cases are declared to have NCB are not entitled to
automatic stays pending judicial review of their RPD decision).
Rahaman v Canada (Ministerof Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 89 (CanLlI) at para 51, [2002] 3 FCR
537 [Rahaman].
37 Levario v Canada (CitizenshipandImmigration), 2012 FC 314 at para 19, 214 ACWS (3d) 562 [Levario].
36
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c. Academic Commentary on Credibility Determinations
Significant scholarly attention has been paid to how refugee adjudicators make credibility
determinations in Canada and elsewhere. One common theme in this literature is that credibility
decision-making is poorly understood, including by decision-makers themselves. For example,
scholars have pointed out that decision-makers seldom have the ability to accurately detect false
testimony empirically verified, which is worrisome considering that most people dramatically
overestimate their abilities in this regard.3 8
Another common theme is that assumptions underlying many credibility assessments
may be contradicted by social-scientific evidence. For instance, scholars have cautioned against
assumed connections between consistency in telling one's story and the truthfulness of that
account. Such assumptions about consistency are problematized by research on the complexity
of memory and autobiographical accounts-complexity that is amplified where the person
offering the account suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder or other mental health
challenges, as is common in the refugee law context.3 Similarly, scholars have highlighted the
dangers posed by refugee adjudicators relying on common sense or intuition to judge whether an
account is plausible or credible, especially where the lived-experiences of decision-makers and
claimants diverge dramatically.4 0 Scholars have also critiqued credibility assessments based on
claimant demeanour because such assessments have long proven unreliable, particularly in crosscultural contexts and in scenarios involving trauma."
An additional theme in the literature on credibility relates to general views of refugees as
liars and fraudsters. Some research focuses on this issue at a macro level, exploring how
administrative, political and cultural factors have converged to construct a "culture of disbelief"
towards refugees in recent years. 4 2 Other research focuses on individual refugee-adjudicators,
showing that while many adjudicators strive to approach each case with an open mind, others

Jenni Millbank, "The Ring of Truth: A Case Study of Credibility Assessment in Particular Social Group Refugee
Determinations" (2009) 21:1 Intl J Refugee L 1 at 29, 32; Hilary Evans Cameron, "Refugee Status Determinations
and the Limits of Memory" (2010) 22:4 Intl J Refugee L 469 at 490 [Cameron, "Memory"]; see also Audrey
Macklin, "Truth and Consequences: Credibility Determination in the Refugee Context" in The Realities ofRefugee
Determinationon the Eve of a New Millennium: The Role of the Judiciary(Haarlem: International Association of
Refugee Law Judges, 1999) 134 at 134 [Macklin, "Truth"].
39 See e.g., Cameron, "Memory", supra note 38; Cecile Rousseau et al, "The Complexity of Determining
Refugeehood: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the Decision-making Process of the Canadian Immigration and
Refugee Board" (2002) 15:1 J Refugee Studies 43 at 57-60; Jane Herlihy, Kate Gleeson & Stuart Turner, "What
Assumptions about Human Behaviour Underlie Asylum Judgments" (2010) 22:3 Intl J Refugee L 351 at 361 ; Trish
Luker, "Decision Making Conditioned by Radical Uncertainty: Credibility Assessment at the Australian Refugee
Review Tribunal" (2013) 25 Int J Refugee L 502 at 519;
40 See e.g., James P Eyster, "Searching for the Key in the Wrong Place: Why 'Common Sense' Credibility Rules
Consistently Harm Refugees" (2012) 30:1 BU ILJ 1; Macklin, "Truth" supranote 38 at 138-139.
41 See e.g. Neal P Pfeiffer, "Credibility Findings in INS Asylum Adjudications: A Realistic Assessment" (1988) 23
Tex Intl LJ 139 at 143-146; Michael Kagan, "Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment
in Refugee Status Determination" (2002) 17:3 Geo Immigr LJ 367 at 378-380; Herlihy et al, "Assumptions" supra
note 39 at 362.
42 See e.g. Jessica Anderson, et al, "The culture of disbelief: An ethnographic approach to understanding an undertheorised concept in the UK asylum system" (2014) Refugee Studies Centre Research Paper No 102; Olga Jubany,
"Constructing Truth in a Culture of Disbelief: Understanding asylum screening from within" (2011) 26:1
International Sociology 74; James Sweeney, "Credibility, Proof and Refugee Law" (2009) 21:4 International Journal
of Refugee Law 700 at 702-703.
38
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believe that most refugee claimants are liars, and some appear to pride themselves on their
perceived ability to impugn the credibility of claimants appearing before them.'
Because of these sorts of concerns, scholars have called for further empirical research on
how refugee adjudicators make credibility decisions and for evidence-based recommendations
for improving decision-making in this area." The remainder of this article represents one attempt
to respond to this call.
III.

CASE STUDY: MCBEAN'S REFUGEE DETERMINATIONS (2008-2010)

David McBean is a refugee adjudicator at the IRB who was the subject of media reports
when yearly refugee-claim statistics revealed that he denied all the refugee claims he heard
during his first three years at the IRB from 2008 to 2010.' This article uses McBean's decisionmaking during this period as a case study of credibility assessments in Canada's refugee
determination process.
The case study begins with a quantitative overview of outcomes in McBean's refugee
decisions, compared to outcomes in refugee claims decided by other adjudicators during the
same period. The quantitative overview is based on electronic data obtained from the IRB's
internal database through an access to information request. 46 This data covers all principal
applicant' refugee claims decided on the merits 48 from 2008 to 2010. There are 39,905 cases in
the dataset, and the relevant datapoints provided for each case include: file number, date of the
decision, name of the decision-maker, 49 country of origin,-o and outcome.-" Next, the case study
undertakes a qualitative assessment of all the written reasons in McBean's principal applicant
refugee determinations decided on the merits from 2008 to 2010. Redacted copies of these

See e.g. Frangois Crepeau & Dephine Nakache, "Critical spaces in the Canadian Refugee Determination System:
1989-2002" (2008) 20 Int'l J Refugee L 50 at 101-103;
See e.g. Robert Thomas, "Assessing the Credibility of Asylum Claims: EU and UK Approaches Examined"
(2006) 8 Eur J Migr & L 79 at 96; Herlihy et al, "Assumptions" supranote 39 at 365.
4
Nicholas Keung, "Getting asylum the luck of the draw?", Toronto Star (4 March 2011), online:
<www.thestar.com>; Nicholas Keung & Jennifer Yang, "Refugee rejections justified, says board", Toronto Star (5
March 2011), online: <www.thestar.com>; Nicholas Keung, "Widowed, wounded, no refuge: Federal judge blasts
ruling by refugee board member with zero acceptance rate", Toronto Star (9 March 2011), online:
<www.thestar.com>; "Treat refugees fairly", Editorial Toronto Star (10 March 2011), online: <www.thestar.com>.
46 Letter from Eric Villamaire, Director, Access to Information and Privacy to Professor Sean Rehaag (4 April
2014).
4
Refugee
Decisions
by
IRB
member
David
McBean
(2008-2010),
online:
<www.yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/handle/10315/13675> (thus, the data treats RPD decisions for a family
with one principal applicant and one or more associated applicants as a single decision, rather than as multiple
decisions).
4 Ibid (thus, the data cover only RPD decisions resulting in a grant or a refusal of refugee protection, excluding
43

withdrawn, abandoned and otherwise resolved claims).
4

Ibid (during the period of the study, most cases were decided by a single adjudicator. However, the IRB

occasionally assigned multiple adjudicators for training purposes. In the dataset, only the identity of the first listed
adjudicator is considered).
5o Ibid (some claimants may have multiple countries of origin. Only the first country of origin listed in the IRB's
database is included in the data).
5 For a general discussion of this methodology and its limitations see Sean Rehaag, "Troubling Patterns in Canadian
Refugee Adjudication" (2008) 39:2 Ottawa Law Review 335 [Rehaag, "Troubling"].
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written reasons were obtained from the IRB through an access to information request.5 2 This
produced a dataset of 174 written reasons, which were digitized and reviewed.
Three points should be made before considering the quantitative and qualitative results of
the case study. First, the study's methodology was selected because most RPD decisions are
unpublished and decisions that are selected for publication are not likely to be representative of
the RPD's full caseload.5 3 Researchers studying decision-making in this area must go beyond
standard legal research methodologies-beyond examining published decisions in legal
databases. Obtaining unpublished data directly from the IRB through access to information
requests is one way to overcome this methodological challenge.-"
Second, 2008 to 2010 was selected for the case study because McBean's zero percent
recognition rate during this period attracted media attention.55 It should be noted, however, that
according to more recent IRB data-after the media stories about his recognition rates were
published-McBean granted refugee status in nine out of 185 principal applicant claims decided
on the merits from 2011 to 2015: one in 2011,56 one in 2012, 5 three in 2013,5" one in 2014,59 and
three in 2015.60
Third, it may be helpful to consider McBean's history with the IRB. In 2007, he was
appointed to his first three-year term as an RPD Member, effective 15 October 2007.61 In
announcing his appointment, Citizenship and Immigration Canada described his experience as
follows: "Prior to his appointment, Mr. McBean was an Operations Service Manager as well as a
Refugee Protection Officer with the IRB. He received his Bachelor of Arts from Brandon
University and a Bachelor of Laws from Osgoode Hall Law School. He was called to the Ontario

52

Supra note 47 (an access to information request sought copies of all written reasons for decisions issued by

McBean in 2008, 2009 and 2010. In response to this request, the IRB provided 1303 records (i.e. pages) containing
174 redacted decisions; ATIP A-2010-00168 (14 June 2011) (one of the decisions (TA9-03220) was included twice.
The duplicate was removed from the dataset. At least one of McBean's decisions appears to have been left out of the
IRB's response to the access to information request. A redacted copy of that decision was obtained from counsel for
the claimant in the case and added to the dataset; Richard Addinall, Personal correspondence by email (28
December 2011), on file with the author).
53 Sean Rehaag, "Patrolling the Borders of Sexual Orientation: Bisexual Refugee Claims in Canada" (2008) 53
McGill Law Journal at 70. See also Jenni Millbank, "Imagining Otherness: Refugee Claims on the Basis of
Sexuality in Canada and Australia" (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 144 at 149.
Mike Larsen & Kevin Walby, eds, Brokering Access: Power, Politics and Freedom of Information Process in
Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012); Access to InformationAct, RSC 1985, c A-1.
Supra note 45 (all sources).
56 Sean Rehaag, "UPDATED 2011 Refugee Claim Data and IRB Member Recognition Rates" (3 August 2012),
online: <www.ccrweb.ca/en/2011-updated-refugee-claim-data> (note that data for this year included principal
applicants and dependents. Thus, one needs to filter out non-principle applicants from the raw data file available on
this website).
Sean Rehaag, "2012 Refugee Claim Data and IRB Member Recognition Rates" (13 May 2013), online:
<www.ccrweb.ca/en/2012-refugee-claim-data>.
Sean Rehaag, "2013 Refugee Claim Data and IRB Member Recognition Rates" (14 April 2014), online:
<www.ccrweb.ca/en/2013-refugee-claim-data>.
59 Sean Rehaag, "2014 Refugee Claim Data and IRB Member Recognition Rates" (8 May 2015), online:
<www.ccrweb.ca/en/2014-refugee-claim-data>.
60 Sean Rehaag, "2015 Refugee Claim Data and IRB Member Recognition Rates" (30 March 2016), online:
<www.ccrweb.ca/en/2015-refugee-claim-data>.
61 Sean Rehaag, "2007 Refugee Claim Data & IRB Member Recognition rates" (10 August 2008) at "Table:

Principal Claimant Grant Rates of IRB Members in 2007", online: <www.ccrweb.ca/documents/rehaagdataO8.htm>
(McBean did not render any decisions on the merits in 2007).
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Bar in 1995."62 McBean was later reappointed for a five-year term, effective 15 October 2010.
As of the time of writing, that term has expired and he is no longer serving as an RPD Member.
a. Quantitative Findings
i. Recognition ratesand NCB Rates
Table 1 summarizes the outcomes in McBean's decisions during the period of the study,
compared to outcomes in decisions made by all RPD members during the same period.
TABLE 1: Outcomes in Principal Applicant Claims: McBean v All RPD Members, by Year (2008-2010)
McBean, David
Year

P

All RPD
R

2008

O_40

2009

0

2010
2008-2010

0
0

NCB Rat
Rat (%)

(%)

Positive

Recognition
Negative

NC8

Total

NCB Rate
Rate (%)

(%)

0

40

0

0.0

5,237

4,143

221

9,380

55,8

2.4

71

32

71

0

45.1

7,316

6,111

173

13,427

545

1.3

61
172

38
70

61
172

0
0

62.3

8.164

8,762

318

16,926

48.2

19

40.7

20,717

19,188

782

39,905

51.9

2.0

Source: IRB ATIP A-2013-40523 (4 April 2013)

As is evident in the table, McBean refused all of the 172 refugee claims he heard from
2008 to 2010. Refusing all claims heard over a three-year period is extremely unusual. The RPD
average recognition rate during this period (51.9 percent) was much higher than McBean's zero
percent recognition rate. In fact, McBean is the only RPD Member deciding ten or more cases
during the period of the study who refused all the claims heard.
As is also evident in Table 1, McBean made NCB declarations far more frequently than is
typical, doing so in 40.7 percent the cases he decided, whereas the equivalent rate among all
RPD Members was only two percent.
ii. Country of Origin
In considering McBean's exceptionally low refugee claim recognition rate and his
unusually high NCB rate, one factor that should be taken into consideration is country of origin.
During the period of the study, RPD Members specialized in cases from particular countries.
Because claimants from different countries may be more or less likely to have well-founded
claims, country specialization may understandably affect recognition rates.6 3
Table 2 breaks down the outcomes in McBean's decisions by country of origin. The table
includes only countries for which McBean decided at least five claims. 64 Table 2 also notes
average recognition rates and NCB rates at the RPD for the relevant countries during the same
period.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada, News Release, "Archived-Appointments to the IRB" (12 October 2007),
online: Government of Canada <www.news.gc.ca>.
63 Rehaag, "Troubling", supranote 51 at 343-345, 346-347.
64 See also Appendix for a table covering all of McBean's decisions.
62
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TABLE 2: Outcomes in Principal Applicant Claims: McBean v All RPD Members, per Country of Origin (Countries with 5+ Decisions by McBean) (2008-2010)
McBean
Country

Positive

Negative

NC8

Al RPD
Total

Recognton NC8R (%)

_________________Rate

Positive

82
11
8
8
6
6
6
45
n/a
172

15

U
6
4
5
1
6
25
n/a
70

82
11
8
8

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
n/a
0.0

6
6
6
45
n/a
172

NC8

____

(%)

Mexico
0
Portugal
0
Trinidad and Tobago
0
Poland
0
Philippines
0
Czech Republic
0
Saint Vincent
0
Other Countries (1-4 Mcean)
0
Other Countries (0 McBean)
n/a
All Countries
0
Source: IRB ATIP A-2013-10523 (4 April 2013)

Negative

18.3
72.7
75.0
50.0
83.3
16.7
100.0
55.6
n/a
40.7

771
0
31
30
31
60
341
803
18,650
20,717

5,279
33
101
56
176
111
536
2.313
10,583
15,188

Total
____

285
14
15
10
16
9
48
130
255
782

6,050
33
132
86
207
171
877
3,116
25,233
39,905

Recognition
R____
ate (%)

12.7
0.0
23.5
34.9
15.0
35.1
38.9
25.8
63.8
51.9

NCBR (%)
____

4.7
42.4
11.4
11.6
7.7
5.3
5.5
4.2
0.9
2.0

As can be seen in Table 2, McBean mostly heard cases from countries with below
average recognition rates. One can also see this phenomenon at work using weighted country of
origin average recognition rates, through which it is possible to calculate expected recognition
rates for individual RPD Members in light of the mix of countries for the cases they decided.
McBean's expected recognition rate from 2008 to 2010 was 17.2 percent.6 5 This partly explains
why his recognition rate (zero percent) is so much lower than the overall RPD average
recognition rate for the same period (51.9 percent). However, this also demonstrates that,
although country of origin is a relevant factor, it does not fully account for McBean's unusually
low recognition rates (i.e. it does not explain why McBean's recognition rate was zero percent
when the expected recognition rate was 17.2 percent). The same pattern is evident in Table 2.
With the exception of Portugal, for every country of origin for which McBean decided at least
five cases, his recognition rate was below the RPD average for that country of origin.
A similar point can be made with respect to the frequency with which McBean makes
NCB declarations. For each country of origin from which he heard at least five cases, he was
much more likely to make NCB declarations than were his colleagues deciding cases from
similar countries. McBean's NCB rate (40.7 percent) also dramatically exceeds his expected
NCB rate (10.1 percent) based on weighted average NCB rates at the RPD for the set of
countries in the cases he decided.

Weighted country of origin averages are calculated as follows:
n = Number of countries from which McBean decided cases from 2008 to 2010
N, = Number of cases decided by McBean from country i from 2008 to 2010
R = Average RPD recognition rate for country i from 2008 to 2010
=Ni x R

+

(82 x 0.127) + (11 x 0.00) + (8 x 0.235)
82 + 11 + 8

+

65

= 0.1718
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iii. Explanationsfor Unexpectedly Low Recognition Rates
In my view, there are three possible explanations for McBean's unexpectedly low
recognition rates and his exceptionally high NCB rates.The first possible explanation is that
while McBean decides cases in more or less the same way as other RPD Members, he was
randomly assigned an unusually high number of unfounded cases from the particular countries of
origin in which he specializes.
This first explanation, while not impossible, is highly improbable. To see why this is the
case, we can calculate the probability of McBean making 172 negative decisions, given the mix
of countries of origin in the cases he was assigned, and assuming that all cases from any
particular country are independent, that RPD members are interchangeable, and that cases from
any particular country are randomly assigned to adjudicators specializing in claims from that
country. One way to calculate this probability would be to assume that the likelihood of success
in any given claim from a particular country is constant at the RPD average recognition rate for
that country over the period of the study, irrespective of who serves as the decision-maker. In
such circumstances, the probability of a decision-maker deciding eighty-two negative cases and
zero positive cases from Mexico from 2008-2010 is approximately one in 70,000.66 If one does
66

The probability is calculated as follows:
n = Number of Mexican cases decided by McBean from 2008 to 2010
RPDnum = Number of Mexican cases decided by all decision-makers at the RPD from 2008 to 2010
RPDneg = Number of Mexican cases refused by all decision-makers at the RPD from 2008 to 2010

(RPDneg
RPDnum)

n

812

=(5279
6050
= 0.00001397

1
71,566
The above probability calculations were made on a with replacement basis because we assumed that the likelihood
of any given case from a particular county succeeding was constant at the RPD average for that country. An
alternative approach would be to calculate the probability on a without replacement basis. For such calculations one
would make the following assumptions: outcomes in each claim would be exactly the same regardless of the
decision-maker (in other words, each claim is properly decided), and within particular countries cases are assigned
randomly to decision-makers. On these assumptions, we know exactly how many claims are positive and negative
for any given country. We then ask what the probability of a decision-maker being randomly assigned a certain
number of negative cases and no positive cases from a pool with a specific number of positive and negative cases
from a given country. In McBean's case, for Mexico we would calculate the probability of being randomly assigned
82 Mexican negative cases and 0 Mexican positive cases from a sample of 6,050 Mexican cases of which 5,279 are
negative as follows:
5,279

5,278

5,277

5,198

6,050

6,049

6,048

5,969

= 0.00001289
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the same calculations for all the countries from which McBean decided at least five cases, the
probability shrinks down to approximately one in thirteen billion.67 Moreover, if one includes all
172 cases McBean decided, the probability is extremely small: approximately one in one
quadrillion.6 8 The first explanation can, therefore, safely be rejected.
A second explanation would be that McBean decided cases in more or less the same way
as other RPD Members, but that the cases he was assigned from particular countries were not
randomly selected, and were instead selected on the basis that they were unlikely to be wellfounded-or, alternatively, that they were selected on other grounds that are related to their
being unlikely to be well-founded. It should be emphasized that this would require selection
based on factors beyond country of origin, which, as we have seen, cannot account for McBean's
low recognition rates. If, for example, cases from Mexico were screened on their merits at an
initial stage in the refugee determination process, and only claims that appeared prima facie
unfounded were assigned to McBean, this might account for his zero percent recognition rate in
the eighty-two Mexican cases he heard from 2008 to 2010. This might also account for his above
average NCB rate in Mexican cases.
While this second explanation is, in principle, plausible, the IRB has, to my knowledge,
never suggested that it uses such a screening process to assign cases (beyond noting that
members specialize in particular countries).69 Moreover, according to IRB responses to access to
information requests, there are no paper or electronic records at the IRB suggesting such a
screening process is used either for McBean or more generally.7 o It would be surprising if the
IRB systematically screened cases, and did so in a way that resulted in McBean being assigned
only prima facie unfounded cases, but that is not reflected in any public or internal IRB records.
As such, the second explanation should also be rejected.

1
77,600
In my view, the without replacement assumptions are simpler to understand and easier to defend. However, because
they produce lower probabilities, I have decided to err on the side of caution and report the with replacement
probabilities.
67 That is to say, given the assumptions set out above, the probability (on a with replacement basis) of McBean
making all negative decisions in cases from Mexico (5,279/6,050)82, Portugal (33/33)", Trinidad & Tobago
(101/132), Poland (56/86)", the Philippines (176/207)6, the Czech Republic (111/171)6 and Saint Vincent
(536/877)6, works out to 1/12,793,871,024. Or, alternatively, on a without replacement basis, this works out to
1/19,282,206,094.
68 Or, alternatively, on a without replacement basis, one in 1.7 quadrillion.
69 For a discussion of how patterns in case assignment may affect recognition rates, including explanations offered
by the IRB, see Rehaag, "Troubling", supra note 51 at 348-362.
70 According to the IRB, there are no records relating to "How cases are assigned to David McBean";
see ATIP A2012-00176 (22 January 2013). The IRB did identify 125 pages of records in relating to "How cases [are] assigned
to RPD members." ATIP A-2012-00177 (16 April 2013) (none of these records indicates that cases are assigned
after any kind of merit screening. The records do include occasional references to particular cases being assigned
only to "experienced" RPD members); see e.g., ibid at 361 (There is also a recurring phrase "All members may be
assigned to all countries, all counsel unless they have specific parameters indicated." In some places there appear to
be parameters listed (typically for the Western region, whereas McBean decided cases from Central region) but the
specific information has been redacted); see e.g, ibid at 348.
71 See Rehaag, "Troubling", supra note 51 at 348-349 (In other words, the only factor related to patterns in case
assignment identified by the RPD Member to explain variations in recognition rates was regional specialization. A
similar point can be made about explanatory notes provided by the IRB when it releases data about outcomes in the
refugee determination process under access to information requests).
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Given the implausibility of the first explanation and the lack of evidence for the second
explanation, the most likely explanation is the third and final one. This explanation is that
McBean does not decide cases in the same way as other RPD Members. That is to say, he does
not apply the same tests and the same standards as his colleagues at the RPD when he decides
refugee claims. If this explanation is right, then, from 2008 to 2010, McBean denied at least
some claims that would have been granted if other RPD Members heard them. This explanation
would account not only for McBean's lower than expected recognition rates and higher than
expected NCB rates, but also for the fact that he, alone among RPD Members deciding ten or
more cases from 2008 to 2010, refused refugee status in every single case that he heard.
b. Qualitative Findings
To get a better understanding of why, from 2008 to 2010, McBean's recognition rates
were so much lower than would be expected based on country of origin averages and why his
NCB rates were also unexpectedly high, written reasons for all of his decisions during this period
were obtained from the IRB through an access to information request. According to my review
of the 174 written reasons, McBean denied the applications for refugee protection in every case.
He also made NCB declarations in seventy-eight cases (44.8 percent).7 2
There are several patterns in the reasons McBean deployed denying claims, some of
which are especially evident if one examines the frequency of particular credibility
determinations types, and if one considers the number of times specific phrases and terms appear
in the 174 cases reviewed.73
i. Overview of CredibilityDeterminations
Ac be ia 3cdly

TABLE 3: Credibility Determinations in Mcgean's Written
Reasons for Decisions (2008-2010)
Cmer

o

ro

no

As can be seen mn Table 3, credibility is a key
Detnsso
Casese
factor in most of McBean's refugee determinations.
Gene~liy~ck~g incredb~W
116
6.
2.
j
37
He explicitly found claimants to be generally lacking
ihcva
Jdtm nton
in credibility in 116 cases (66.7%). In thirty-seven
cases (21.3%) he denied the claim based on grounds T.tI
174
j 10D.0
Souce:AT)A-2100O18
(4
Jne2011)
other than credibility without making explicit
credibility findings, and yet nonetheless indicated that this should not be taken to mean that he
believed the claimants to be credible. To express this holding, he used various versions of the
phrase, "Even if I were to accept the claimant's evidence as true, which I do not necessarily do,
the claim fails." In a further twenty cases (11.5%), McBean did not say anything about
credibility and denied the case on other grounds. In only one case (0.6%), McBean explicitly
These figures differ slightly from similar statistics calculated based on the quantitative data provided by the IRB.
This may reflect different ways of including or excluding cases from datasets. For example, one can calculate
decision-dates from the date when a decision was signed by the adjudicator or from the date when the signed
decision was processed by the IRB or mailed to the claimant. This may also reflect a small number of data entry
errors in the datasets, either at the IRB or in my review of the cases. For example, in the IRB's database, one case
was not recorded as including a NCB declaration, yet such a finding was clearly made in the written reasons; See
RPD
File
NO.
TA8-19574
(private
proceeding)
at
para
13,
online:
<www.yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/handle/10315/13675>.
73 The number of times particular terms or phrases appear were calculated based on searches of the digitized reasons
for decisions. Digitization was not manually verified, thus it is possible that the terms or phrases in fact appear more
often but were not recognized as such due to uncorrected digitization errors.
72
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indicated that he believed the claimant's account, but nonetheless denied the claim on other
grounds." Interestingly, he was not the sole decision maker in this last case, because a panel of
three RPD members decided it. It is, therefore, apparent that McBean seldom believes the stories
recounted by refugee claimants.
ii. Groundsfor CredibilityDeterminations
In the cases where McBean made negative general credibility findings, he often seemed
preoccupied by differences between various versions of the claimant's evidence. This can be
seen in the phrase that he typically uses to begin his credibility analysis: "It was apparent
throughout the hearing that there were a number of serious discrepancies in the claimant's
evidence when the oral testimony was compared to the Personal Information Form (PIF) and the
other documents available." The phrase "It was apparent throughout the hearing that there were a
number of" appears ninety-four times in the 174 cases reviewed. Regardless of whether he used
this particular phrase, in all 116 cases where he found the claimant to be generally lacking in
credibility, he explicitly noted differences between various versions of the claimant's account.
Often, McBean characterized the differences in the evidence as contradictions or discrepancies.
The term "contradiction" appears 129 times and the terms "discrepancy" and "discrepancies"
appear 228 and 287 times respectively. At other times the differences are characterized as
omissions. The term "omission" appears 244 times. Whether characterized as contradictions,
discrepancies, or omissions, McBean usually identified the differences in claimant evidence by
comparing the claimant's testimony with documents submitted in support of the claimant's
application (including the PIF), or with documents prepared by the government, such as notes
taken by immigration officers at the time when claimants first apply for refugee protection. He
placed particularly heavy reliance on the latter; there are 296 references to immigration officer
notes.
Another pattern in McBean's credibility determinations is that the discrepancies he
identified often relate to specific quantitative details in the claimant's evidence, including dates,
times and number of assailants. The following passages are typical in this regard:
[The claimant] was asked how many men there were in the car and he said three
came out. When asked if there were more in the car, he said there were a total of
three. When asked why his PIF would indicate that there were four men in the car,
he said that he had not included the driver. I do not find this explanation for this
contradiction to be satisfactory.
In both the PIF and in oral testimony, [XXX] was menaced by a trio of [XXX].
However, as noted at the hearing, in the notes of the Immigration Officer made at
the time that [XXX] made his claim, it is stated that he was menaced by two
people. [XXX] stated that he meant that one person spoke and the other two were
violent and that he thought that he had said that there were three [XXX]. I do not
find [XXX]'s explanations satisfactory.7 6
RPD
File
NO.
TA7-15564
(private
proceeding),
<www.yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/handle/10315/13675>.
Supra note 47 (see decisions: TA7-10912/12205/12253/122540).
76 Supra note 47 (see decisions: TA7-09899/TA7-09982/TA7-09983/TA8-05827/TA8-05828/TA8-05829).
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The claimant stated that his problems started with the family of criminals in
[XXX] 2004. However, in the interview with the [Immigration Officer], the
claimant stated that his problems started in [XXX] 2003. When confronted with
the discrepancy, the claimant stated that the [XXX] 2003 date was incorrect. The
claimant could not explain why the date was incorrect other than to say generally
that he was nervous during the interview with the [Immigration Officer]. I do not
find this explanation satisfactory.
In oral testimony, the claimant agreed with the statement that he had been
kidnapped for 10 days, yet when pressed for the dates he stated from [XXX]
through [XXX]. However, as noted at the hearing in the Immigration Officer
Interview Notes, he stated that he had been kidnapped for 15 days. The claimant
stated that all of the periods were approximate and that he did not want to correct
the Refugee Protection Officer (RPO) on her mistaken calculation. I do not find
the claimant's explanations satisfactory.
The claimant stated as per her PIF, that she was assaulted at 8:00 a.m. However,
as noted at the hearing, the Public Ministry document stated the incident took
place at 10:00 a.m. 7 9

McBean also frequently found that the failure to mention certain details when other less
significant details were included in a particular version of a claimant's story amounted to an
omission that undermined the claimant's credibility. Often he noted that these accounts are
otherwise "quite detailed" (a phrase used 26 times in this way). This description is sometimes
used even when the account in question is actually rather brief, including one case where the
claimant's narrative was only twelve lines long.o
When claimants attempted to explain contradictions, discrepancies, or omissions by
saying that they did not know what level of detail to provide in the documents they submitted,
McBean discounted these arguments, often by saying something like: "The directions for filling
out the PIF narrative [were] quite clear in that all significant incidents are to be included. I find
that this omission further undermines the claimant's credibility." The phrase "directions for
filling out" is used in this way sixty-two times in the 174 cases reviewed. Similarly, when
claimants attempted to explain contradictions, discrepancies, or omissions by saying that they
deferred to counsel who prepared their supporting documents, McBean rejected these arguments
on the grounds that the claimant agreed in writing and at the hearing that the PIF was complete
and accurate. The phrase "complete and accurate" is used in this way twenty-two times.
Along similar lines, when claimants tried to explain contradictions, discrepancies, or
omissions by pointing to mental health challenges that affect their ability to testify, McBean
often dismissed these explanations. In some cases, McBean discounted these arguments because
no expert psychological evidence was presented about impairing psychological conditions. For
example, in one case he noted, "While counsel asked me to take into account the claimant's
7
78
7

Supra note 47 (see decisions: TA7-11451).
Supra note 47 (see decisions: TA7-11051/58/59/60/61).
Supra note 47 (see decisions: TA9-05027).

s0 Supra note 47 (see decisions: TA7-11417/18/19).
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emotional state of mind when considering the claimant's testimony, no psychological evidence
was produced to indicate that the claimant would have any significant difficulty telling his
story."" The phrase "no psychological evidence was" is used in this way seven times. However,
in other cases, he disregarded expert psychological reports because he believed that the claimant
duped the medical professionals preparing the reports. For instance, in one case he writes, "I am
mindful of the psychological report with respect to the female claimant on file. However, this
report is based on a story that I simply do not believe so I give it little weight." 8 2 The phrase "is
based on a story" is used eight times in this way.
McBean's preoccupation with inconsistencies in claimant evidence is not only reflected
in the cases reviewed, but he also acknowledged that this is his standard means of assessing
credibility. As he puts it in a particularly telling passage from a decision where he did accept
expert psychological evidence: "[Due to the claimant's mental disabilities], I totally agree with
counsel for the claimant that this was not a typical hearing and that credibility could not simply
be assessed by the usual 'Here you said A, there you said B, please explain why the two answers
are different' types of questions.""
In addition to this "usual" way that McBean tested credibility, a few other patterns are
evident in the cases reviewed. One is that he often found claimants' testimony to be vague or
evasive and drew negative credibility inferences on this basis. The term "vague" appears fortytwo times and the term "evasive" appears thirty-four times. Another is that he frequently found
that supporting documents provided by the claimant were not genuine. The terms "forged" and
"forgery" / "forgeries" appear eighteen times and twenty-eight times respectively. He also often
relied on delay in making a refugee claim to infer that the claimant's fear of persecution is not
genuine. The term "delay" appears fifty-eight times.
After noting some or all of these problems regarding the claimant's credibility, McBean
typically concluded his credibility analyses by using a variation of the following passage: "Given
the serious discrepancies, omissions and other problems with respect to major issues, I find that
the claimant was generally lacking in credibility. I simply do not believe that, on a balance of
probabilities, that any of the significant events that the claimant alleged happened [...], actually
happened and as such the claim fails."" The phrase "Given the serious" is used in this way
eighty-nine times. Similarly, the phrases "I simply do not believe" and "do not believe" appear
140 times and 203 times, respectively.
While McBean frequently indicates that he does not believe claimants, it is also
noteworthy that not once in the 174 reviewed decisions does he indicate that sworn testimony
offered by claimants was presumed to be true.

81

82

Supra note 47 (see decisions: TA8-01701).
Supra note 47 (see decisions: TA8-09146/TA8-13838).

Interestingly, after this passage McBean goes on to rely on inconsistencies to deny the claim: "Small details and
big details changed from telling to telling. Dates changed from one decade to another. This was entirely expected,
given the psychological evidence on file [...] Even Dr. [XXX] notes that in three years of treatment the claimant has
never given a fully consistent history of his past. While it is clear that something happened to the claimant in the
past, given his current permanent mental condition, I doubt that we will ever truly know what that something was. I
find on a balance of probabilities that all of these incidents mentioned by the claimant are merely manifestations of
the claimant's psychiatric condition and that they never actually occurred."); supra note 47 (see decision: TA608970).
Emphasis added.
83
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iii. Copied Alternative Groundsfor Denying Refugee Claims
In most of McBean's decisions, credibility was not the sole reason for refusal, and, as
noted earlier, credibility was sometimes not a reason for refusal at all. When refusing cases on
alternative grounds, McBean frequently copied passages directly from his other decisions,
without attribution or any indication that the passages were copied. Often these were lengthy
passages about the availability of state protection against particular types of persecution 5 or
about the availability of a viable internal flight alternative for particular groups of claimants. 8 6 At
other times the copied passages were brief and were used to refute specific factual allegations"
or to characterize a specific type of harm as falling outside the scope of refugee protection."
c. Case Study Conclusions
According to the quantitative data obtained from the IRB, McBean denied refugee
applications and made NCB declarations much more frequently than would be expected based on
country of origin averages from 2008 to 2010. The most likely explanation for these unexpected
rates is that he decides cases differently than his colleagues, and that some claimants, who had
their claims denied by McBean, would have obtained refugee protection if their cases had been
assigned to other adjudicators. This raises serious fairness concerns.
The qualitative data is also troubling. In my view, having reviewed over 1,300 pages of
written reasons for decisions by McBean, there are reasons to be concerned about the tests and
standards he uses. In particular, frequency with which he simply does not believe stories
recounted by claimants is surprising. Similarly, it is worrisome that he only indicated that he
generally believed the claimant in one of the 174 cases he decided (and in that case he was sitting
on a panel of three RPD members). It is also troubling that he typically offered for holding that
claimants generally lack credibility. In particular, he regularly drew negative credibility
inferences from relatively minor inconsistencies, and he was very quick to discount explanations
for these inconsistencies. He also relied heavily on notes taken by immigration officers at the
time that refugee claims were first made-a practice that the Federal Court has warned can lead
to unreasonable credibility determinations unless the RPD carefully considers the highly
constrained circumstances in which such notes are prepared.89
Supra note 47 (For example, for lengthy copied passages regarding the availability of state protection against antiRoma persecution in the Czech Republic, see decisions: TA8-20470/TA8-20518/TA8-20519; TA7-15160/TA715188/TA7-15189; TA8-10888/TA8-10948/TA8-10949/TA8-10950;
TA8-18021; TA8-19249/TA8-19301/TA821528/TA8-21529/TA8-21530).
86 Supra note 47 (For example, for lengthy copied passages regarding Mexico City being a viable internal flight
alternatives for sexual minorities facing persecution elsewhere in Mexico, see: TA6-07832; TA6-08970; TA703282; TA7-08664; TA7-09246; TA7-11162; TA8-01468; TA8-06422.)
Supra note 47 (this passage appears 11 times: "it is not always easy to trace people in Mexico. There is no
comprehensive personal database in Mexico, and access to the main existing databases requires a court order and/or

written permission from the public prosecutor's office.").
Supra note 47 (this passage appears 15 times, with slight changes to reflect the number and gender of claimants:
"The claimant alleged that he is a victim of crime based on a criminal vendetta. As such, his claim under section 96
of the IRPA fails for lack of nexus to any of the Convention grounds.").
8 Kanapathipillaiv Canada (MCI), [1998] FCJ No 1110 (QL) (FCTD) at para 8; Lubana v Canada (MCI), 2003
FCT 116 (CanLII) at para 13; TrianaAguirre v Canada (MCI), 2008 FC 571 (CanLIl) at paras 27-3 1; Wu v Canada
(MCI), 2010 FC 1102 (CanLlI) at para 16; Hamdar v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 382 (CanLIl) at paras 44-49; Cao v
Canada (MCI),2012 FC 694 (CanLIl) at paras 3-7; Cetinkaya v Canada(MCI), 2012 FC 8 (CanLII) at para 51.
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After having read all of McBean's decisions from 2008 to 2010, it is clear that he takes
an adversarial approach to adjudicating refugee claims. His hearings, at least as he describes
them in his written decisions, appear to amount to cross-examinations aiming to impugn the
claimant's credibility.90 In cases that survive this cross-examination, he denies the claims on
other grounds. In such cases, it is concerning that he often copies passages from his other
decisions without attribution- suggesting that he has standard templates for refusal, raising
questions about whether he approaches each case with an open mind and properly turns his mind
to the particularities of each case. This practice also raises questions about whether claimants are
provided copies of all the materials that are being used against them, and are afforded the
opportunity to explain how their cases may differ from the cases that McBean copies from
without attribution.
In short, based on this quantitative and qualitative examination of McBean's decisions
from 2008 to 2010, there are serious reasons to be concerned about the frequency with which
McBean denies refugee claims, and the reasoning he deploys to justify rejecting these claims.
IV.

DISCUSSION

Several implications flow from two basic observations. The first relates to the broader
refugee law context, and the second comes from the case study. First, with regard to the broader
context, the stakes involved in refugee determinations are high because uncorrected false
negatives by definition leave people at risk of deportation to face persecution, torture or death.
This has led the Supreme Court of Canada to hold that the constitutional right to life, liberty and
security of the person are engaged in the refugee determination process. As a result, the process
must comply with principles of procedural justice.9 1
Second, notwithstanding the constitutional requirement that the refugee determination
process comply with principles of fundamental justice, there is evidence that outcomes in refugee
claims come down to the luck of the draw and hinge in part on who is assigned to hear the
claim. 9 2 One example of such evidence from this case study showing at least some refugee
adjudicators demonstrate much more proclivity for refusing claims than others. As a result, they
make sustained efforts to find reasons to disbelieve claimants and frequently refuse refugee
claims on the basis that claimants are not credible. There are at least three sets of implications
that result from combining these observations.
a. Removing Outlier Decision-Makers: Reasonable Apprehension ofBias
One way to think about the luck of the draw in refugee adjudication is to view
inconsistent adjudication as an exception from the norm. Such a perspective is reflected in a
common reaction to empirical evidence of the kind offered in this case study. This reaction is
concerned mostly with the rule of law, which includes the principles that like cases should be
decided alike and that outcomes should be based on evidence and law rather than on extraneous

See supra note 62 (it is worth recalling that as a lawyer and a former Refugee Protection Officer, McBean has
training and experience in cross-examinations).
91 Singh, supranote 9.
90

92

Sean Rehaag, Julianna Beaudoin & Jennifer Danch, "No Refuge: Hungarian Romani Refugee Claimants in

Canada" (2015) 52:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 704 at 751-754.
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extra-legal factors.93 On this view, if refugee claim outcomes hinge, at least some of the time, on
who happens to decide the case, this amounts to a breakdown in the rule of law.
Reasonable apprehension of bias is one legal doctrine that might be deployed to correct
such breakdowns in the rule of law. According to this doctrine, a decision can be overturned if a
reasonable and properly informed person, having thought through the matter realistically, would
conclude that the decision-maker, "whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide
fairly." 94 Notice that the focus of this doctrine is not on whether the decision-maker is, in fact,
biased. Rather the focus is on whether an informed person might reasonably believe that the
decision-maker is biased.
The case law on whether (and if so when) one can infer a reasonable apprehension of bias
from evidence that a decision-maker is predisposed towards particular outcomes is decidedly
mixed. This is not surprising, as these issues raise difficult questions that go to the heart of
adjudication, including: what does it means to be impartial when decision-makers, like all human
beings, have views and perspectives that no doubt impact their decision-making-sometimes
consciously and sometimes not? 95
The Supreme Court of Canada grappled with this question in R v S (RD). 96 The case
involved a racialized young man who was accused of assaulting a white peace officer. The
accounts of the incident by the accused and by the peace officer differed substantially. In
delivering her reasons for acquitting the accused, the judge in the case drew on her knowledge of
her local community and noted that police officers had been known to overreact to non-white
groups and to mislead the court. This led the crown to allege a reasonable apprehension of bias
on the part of the judge. 97
On appeal, the Supreme Court divided sharply-in a variety of different ways-on the
question of the test for reasonable apprehension of bias, and on the application the test to the
facts of the case. Despite these differences, the justices largely agreed on the principle that, while
judges are required to be impartial, they cannot be expected to be neutral. For example,
L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin JJ noted that a reasonable person expects that "triers of fact will
be properly influenced in their deliberations by their individual perspectives on the world in
which the events in dispute in the courtroom took place." 98 What matters is not whether judges
have perspectives and views (they inevitably will), but whether they are able to keep an open
mind. In other words, to use Jennifer Nedelsky's terminology, whether they are able to maintain
"the capacity for 'enlargement of mind' that makes autonomous, impartial judgment possible." 9 9
Along similar lines, Cory J. noted that "not every favourable or unfavourable disposition attracts
the label of bias or prejudice." 0 0 He went on to say, "it is not enough to show that a particular . .
[decision-maker] has certain beliefs, opinions or even biases. It must be demonstrated that those

93

This principle is regarded as central to the rule of law from a variety of theoretical perspectives; see e.g. Lon

Fuller, The Moralityof Law, rev ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) at 81-91 (see especially Fuller's 8th
principle of legality); HLA Hart, The Concept ofLaw, 3rd ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at ch 8; John Rawls,
A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1971) at 164-165.
94 Committee for Justice & Liberty v Canada (NationalEnergy Board) (1976), [1978] 1 SCR 369 at 394, 68 DLR
716.
95 See Jennifer Nedelsky, "Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to the Law" (1997) 42:1 McGill LJ 91.
96 [1997] 3 SCR 484, 151 DLR (4th) 193 [R v S].
97 Ibid.

98 Ibid at para 39.
99 Nedelsky, supra note 96; R v S, supra note 97 at para 42.
100 Rv S, supra note 97 at para 105.
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beliefs, opinions or biases prevent the ... [decision-maker] from setting aside any preconceptions
and coming to a decision on the basis of the evidence.""o' Or, as the Supreme Court paraphrased
in a later case, the "essence of impartiality lies in the requirement of the judge to approach the
case to be adjudicated with an open mind."1 02
In this context, the question to be asked is whether the sort of evidence set out in the
present study could be the basis of an argument for reasonable apprehension of bias-whether
arguments about refugee adjudicators failing to approach cases with an open mind might be used
to address challenges that outlier refugee adjudicators may pose to the rule of law.
This argument was partly addressed in Turoczi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), where a refugee claimant asked the Federal Court to overturn a McBean decision
due to reasonable apprehension of bias.103 The applicant introduced evidence about McBean's
zero percent recognition rates and his expected recognition rates in light of weighted country of
origin averages.o Also introduced into evidence was a newspaper article quoting a former Chair
of the IRB who said that a zero percent recognition rate "certainly hints at bias, that this member
has an attitude about either particular claimants from particular countries or claimants in
general." 0 Based, on this evidence, the applicant asserted that "in the eyes of the reasonable
person ... the number of acceptances by the Board Member is astronomically different from his
colleagues [and that] one must be wilfully blind to ... not conclude that there is a reasonable
apprehension of bias." 10 6
The Federal Court, however, disagreed, finding that the applicant failed to establish a
reasonable apprehension of bias because the statistics cited were not "sufficiently
informative."1 0 ' In the court's view, the statistics merely established different acceptance and
rejection rates across decision-makers, without offering sufficient analysis of the potential causes
10 As the court put it:
of these differences.o
Although the statistical data presented by the applicants may raise an eyebrow for
some, the informed reasonable person, thinking the matter through, would
demand to know much more, including:
*
*
*
*
*

Were all of the figures, including, importantly, the weighted country
origin averages, properly compiled?
Did the RPD randomly assign cases within each country of origin? If
not, how did the RPD assign cases?
Can factors affecting the randomness of case assignment be reliably
adjusted for statistically?
If so, what are the adjusted statistics, and what is their significance?
If the RPD did randomly assign cases, what is the statistical
significance of the Member's rejection rate?

Ibid at para 107.
Wewaykum Indian Bandv Canada, SCC 45 at para 58, [2003] 2 SCR 259.
103 2012 FC 1423, 224 ACWS (3d) 429 [Turoczi].
104 Ibid at paras
2-4.
105 Ibid at para
16.
106 Ibid at para
5.
101

102

Ibid at para 13.
1os Ibid at paras 12-19.
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Beyond the Member's relative performance within the RPD, is there
anything objective impugning the Member's decisions (i.e. that
suggests they are wrongly decided)?
Accounting for appropriate factors (if that is possible), are the
Member's decisions more frequently quashed on judicial review than
would be expected?
Has the Member made recurring errors of a certain type, e.g. on
credibility, state protection, etc., that bear a semblance to the
impugned decision?

In short, the informed reasonable person, thinking the matter through, would
demand a statistical analysis of this data by an expert based upon and having
taken into consideration all of the various factors and circumstances that are
unique to and impact on determinations of refugee claims before he or she would
think it more likely than not that the decision-maker would not render a fair

decision.109
In coming to the conclusion that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias, the court
also noted that the applicant did not raise any substantive concerns with the decision under
review.1 10 In addition, the court indicated that the initial refugee claim was so weak that McBean
was "practically obliged ... to decide as he did ... [A]n informed person, viewing the matter
realistically and practically-and having thought the matter through-would conclude that there
was very little likelihood that any member would have decided the claim differently.""'
The court was correct in finding that the evidence presented in this case did not meet the
threshold for establishing a reasonable apprehension of bias. Allegations of reasonable
apprehension of bias based on empirical evidence of inconsistent decision-making should be
approached with the same caution and rigour that counsel contemplating constitutional test case
litigation would employ. Without a solid evidentiary foundation, including expert analysis, such
cases will, and should, fail.
However, two aspects of the court's reasoning are problematic.11 2 First, the underlying
merits of the refugee claim under review were not relevant to the question of whether there was a
reasonable apprehension of bias and should not have been considered by the court. To see why
this is the case, consider the following hypothetical. Imagine that a judge hearing a case has a
financial interest in the outcome of the case (suppose, for example, the judge is a major
shareholder in a corporation being sued). Next, imagine that the outcome would likely have been
the same regardless of who serves as the judge (the plaintiff's legal case against the corporation
is weak). In these circumstances, is there a reasonable apprehension of bias? The answer, in my

Ibid at para 15.
Ibid at para 18.
1 Ibid.
112 It is worth nothing that when dealing with large datasets, statistical significance may not tell us very much about
whether observed differences are meaningful, thus other measures may be preferable; see e.g., Lawrence Kreiger
Kennon Sheldon, "What Makes Lawyers Happy?: A Data-Driver Prescription to Redefine Professional Success"
(2015) 83:2 Geo Wash L Rev 554, n 82 (there are also tricky questions to be asked about how to interpret statistical
significance when dealing with full data on a population rather than with data for samples of a population).
109
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view, is yes.113 Despite the weakness of the plaintiff's case, the plaintiff is nonetheless entitled to
have the case heard by a judge who does not have a financial interest in the litigation. Along
similar lines, irrespective of the merits of refugee claims, claimants are entitled to have their
claims heard by decision-makers who approach cases with open minds.
Second, the Court's questions about recurring errors in McBean's decisions and the
frequency of his decisions being overturned on judicial review confuse two different matters.
These questions relate to the lawfulness of decisions (i.e. whether a decision-maker commits
reviewable errors). Reasonable apprehension of bias, however, is not about reviewable errors.
Indeed, if a party has to demonstrate reviewable errors by a decision-maker in order to succeed
with a reasonable apprehension of bias argument, there would be no point to alleging reasonable
apprehension of bias in the first place. Instead, the party could simply ask the Court to overturn
the decision based on reviewable errors. Reasonable apprehension of bias is meant to address
more than reviewable errors. A decision's lawfulness does not tell us much about the quality of
the decision-just as the fact that an architect's designs comply with the building code does not
tell much about the quality of the architect's work. In both cases, lawfulness (i.e. no reviewable
errors, no violations of the building code) does, of course, matter. But there is much more to
quality decision-making (and to good architecture) than lawfulness.
Even if we set aside these conceptual problems, it is not at all clear, on a practical level,
how one should interpret the relative frequency of a decision-maker being overturned on judicial
review due to reviewable errors. In the refugee law context, decision-makers can easily create
barriers to judicial oversight. For example, when decision-makers issue NCB declarations,
claimants do not benefit from automatic stays on removal pending judicial review."' This means
that it is less likely that claimants will apply for or follow through with judicial review. Along
similar lines, courts are deferential towards RPD credibility determinations on judicial review,"'
meaning that decision-makers denying claims due to credibility may be overturned less
frequently than those who deny claims on other grounds. In fact, given the ease with which
refugee adjudicators can insulate their decisions from judicial review, one could plausibly assert
that a low rate of decisions being overturned on judicial review is as indicative of a problem as a
high rate. Such an assertion could be based on the argument that decision-makers in high-stakes
refugee adjudication should prepare reasons with the aim of facilitating review-by for example,
making their uncertainties explicit, clearly and persuasively articulating the strongest counterarguments, and attempting to offer a fulsome account of their reasoning. Where, instead,
113

My view accords with the position of the Canadian Judicial Council, which advises that, due to reasonable

perceptions of bias,
a judge should not preside over a case in which he or she has a financial or property interest that
could be affected by its outcome or in which the judge's interest would give rise in a reasonable,
fair minded and informed person, to reasoned suspicion that the judge would not act impartially.
This general rule applies whether the interest is itself the subject matter of the controversy or
where the outcome of the case could substantially affect the value of any interest or property
owned by the judge, the judge's family or close associates.
See Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (2004), online: <http://www.cjcccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/newspubjudicialconductPrinciples en.pdf> at 45
114 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (prior to SOR/2012-272 amendments), s
231(2) (prior to SOR/2012-272 amendments) (under the revised system, claims that are declared to have no credible
basis or to be manifestly unfounded cannot be appealed to the Refugee Appeal Division and claimants who cannot
access RAD do not benefit from automatic stays of removal pending judicial review); see IRPA, supra note 2, s
110(2)(c); IRPR, supranote 35, s 231 (as amended by SOR/2012-272).
115 Supra note 21.

Vol. 38

Windsor Review ofLegal andSocialIssues

59

decision-makers aim to craft review-proof decisions, they misunderstand their role in the refugee
determination process, adopting the role of an advocate for particular outcomes, rather than that
of an administrative adjudicator explaining their decisions.
Another practical difficulty relates to a lack of transparency in Federal Court decisionmaking that makes it challenging to supplement quantitative data about outcome rates on judicial
review with qualitative data. Applications for judicial review of refugee determinations are
subject to a leave requirement,116 and the Federal Court denies leave in the vast majority of
applications-almost always without providing reasons."' As a result, there are relatively few
cases through which one could examine written reasons to see how the Federal Court treats
particular aspects of an RPD Member's body of decision-making. Thus, if one wants to examine
an RPD Member's record on judicial review one must rely largely on the kind of bare statistics
that the court cautions against in Turoczi.
Therefore, the Supreme Court was incorrect in suggesting that evidence of reviewable
errors and outcome rates on judicial review are helpful for assessing reasonable apprehension of
bias. That being said, because the Court indicated that this information is relevant, data about
judicial review of McBean's RPD decisions was obtained from the IRB and from Federal Court
dockets."' Out of 166 McBean decisions from 2008 to 2010 for which data is available, there
were eighty-two applications for judicial review. That is to say, 49.4% of McBean's cases were
subject to applications for judicial review. The frequency of applications for judicial review was
much lower in McBean's decisions involving NCB declarations (twenty out of seventy cases,
28.6%) than in his decisions that were denied without such a declaration (sixty-two of ninety-six
cases, 64.6%). Of the eighty-two applications for judicial review, thirty-six (43.9%) were not
perfected. Of the forty-six applications for judicial review that were perfected, the Federal Court
granted leave in eight (17.4% of perfected applications, 9.8% of all applications for judicial
review). Finally, of the eight applications where leave was granted, judicial review was granted
in three (37.5% of applications where leave was granted, 6.5% of perfected applications for
judicial review, and 3.7% of all applications for judicial review). As a point of comparison, from
2005 to 2010 there were 22,914 applications for judicial review brought by unsuccessful refugee
claimants. Of these, 4,666 (20.4%) were not perfected. Of the 18,248 that were perfected, 3,250
(17.8% of perfected applications, 14.2% of all applications) were granted leave, and, of those,
judicial review was granted in 1,415 cases (43.5% of applications where leave was granted, 7.8%
of perfected applications for judicial review, and 6.2% of all applications for judicial review).11 9
In other words, in cases that were subject to applications for judicial review, McBean's rates of
116
117

IRPA, supra note 2, s 72.
Sean Rehaag, "Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?" (2012) 38:1 Queens LJ 1 at

35-38, 52-54 [Rehaag, "Luck"].
"" Letter from R Gould to D Younes (18 June 2012); the data obtained from the IRB included 181 RPD decisions
where McBean was involved and listed the outcomes in these decisions and, where these decisions were subject to

applications for judicial review, the Federal Court docket number. The Federal Court dockets contain information
about whether applications were perfected, and about outcomes in those applications.. In some cases, documents
from the court record were obtained to confirm details from the docket. Of the 181 cases listed in the IRB's data, 14
were eliminated from the dataset. One claim (TA6-12048) was listed three times so the two extras were eliminated,
one claim was linked to an incorrect Federal Court docket number (TA7-10912) so that claim was eliminated, two
claims were linked to a single Federal Court docket number (TA7-06791 & TA6-16901) so these were combined,
and 10 claims (TA6-02529, TA6-07941, TA6-14902, TA7-02899, TA7-07808, TA7-09551, TA7-12527, TA712734, TA7-13170 & TA6-0723 1) did not appear to be cases where McBean made the final determination so these
were excluded. This left a dataset of 166 claims.
119 Rehaag, "Luck", supra note 118 at 51.
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reversal in perfected applications were broadly similar to the rates for other RPD Members,
though claimants were much less likely to perfect applications for judicial review in cases
involving McBean than in cases involving other decision-makers.12 0
Substantively, credibility determinations were raised as an issue in all of the applications
for judicial review involving McBean's decisions where leave was granted. In Argueta v Canada
12 1
the Court found that McBean unreasonably drew
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
negative credibility inferences from a lack of corroborating media accounts,122 unreasonably
discounted medical evidence, 123 unreasonably relied on alleged discrepancies between notes
taken by an immigration officer and the PIF / testimony at the hearing, 12 4 unreasonably found
that supporting documents were forgeries, 125 and unreasonably found that there was no
corroborating evidence. 12 6 In Xu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),127 the
Court held that McBean unreasonably found the claimant generally lacking credibility, 12 8

unreasonably characterized certain statements as contradictory when in fact there was no
contradiction, 129 unreasonably rejected plausible explanations for a lack of supporting
documents, including media reports,130 unreasonably relied on differences between notes taken
by an immigration officer and the PIF to draw negative credibility inferences,1 31 and
unreasonably rejected explanations offered by the claimant regarding alleged inconsistencies. 13 2
13 3
In Fernandez Ortega v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
the Court found
that McBean unreasonably determined a claimant lacked credibility based on minor and
inconsequential details of the claimant's testimony, 13 4 and unreasonably relied on credibility
problems identified with regard to one claimant to draw negative credibility inferences about
another claimant.135 In addition, in one case that was upheld on other grounds, 13 6 the Court found

120 One possible explanation for the lower rates of perfection could relate to legal aid practices regarding when legal
aid will be provided to refugee claimants seeking to judicially review negative RPD decisions. If judicial reviews of
cases with negative credibility findings are unlikely to succeed before the Federal Court, they are also unlikely to be
funded by legal aid programs with merit-screening processes. As such, one might argue that, to the extent that cases
with particular types of findings (e.g. negative credibility determinations, no credible basis findings) are less likely
to succeed on judicial review, they are also less likely to attract public funding for counsel for judicial review, and,
thus, applications for judicial review in these cases would also be less likely to be perfected; see Sean Rehaag, "The
Role of Counsel in Canada's Refugee Determination System: An Empirical Assessment" (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall
Law Journal 71 [Rehaag, "Counsel"].
121 2011 FC 1146, 4 Imm LR (4th) 333.
122
123
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132 Ibid at para 10.
133 2009 FC 754, 182 ACWS (3d) 988 (this decision involved two separate claims that were heard together. The
court overturned the decision for one claim but upheld the other claim) [Fernandez].
134 Ibid at para
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201.
130

131

Vol. 38

Windsor Review ofLegal andSocialIssues

61

McBean's evidentiary determinations to be flawed.13 7 At the same time, however, in the four
remaining cases, McBean's credibility and evidentiary findings were explicitly upheld.13 8
What, then, should one make of McBean's record on judicial review? Unfortunately, it
would seem that we do not know very much about the Federal Court's views of McBean's
decision-making from 2008 to 2010. Only a handful of his decisions during this period were
fully considered by the Federal Court. Most were not subject to applications for judicial review,
and many of those that were subject to applications for judicial review were not perfected. In the
cases that were perfected, most were denied leave without any explanation from the court. In this
context, it is difficult to determine whether McBean's average rates of reversal in perfected
applications and the above average rates of non-perfection are due to his decisions being
generally free from reviewable errors or due to the use of strategies-such as making NCB
declarations or general no credibility findings-to craft review-proof decisions and to otherwise
reduce the likelihood of successful applications for judicial review.
And what, if anything, should we infer from the small number of applications for judicial
review that were fully considered by the court? On the one hand, all of the successful
applications for judicial review involved credibility determinations that were rejected by the
court in a context where courts are reluctant to interfere with credibility assessments. On the
other hand, the court explicitly upheld McBean's credibility determinations in other casespresumably rejecting arguments impugning many more of his credibility assessments in cases
where leave was denied. In my view, it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from all of
this, which is one reason why I disagree with the court that this sort of information is important
or helpful.
At the end of the day, while I have concerns about some of the further information that
the court in Turoczi suggests a reasonable person would demand about McBean's recognition
rates, the most interesting feature of the court's reasoning is not the specific information that the
court says a reasonable person would demand. Rather, the most interesting aspect of the court's
decision is that the decision leaves open the possibility of making a reasonable apprehension of
bias argument based on expert analysis of patterns in an administrative decision-maker's cases.
In leaving open the possibility of reasonable apprehension of bias arguments on these
grounds, the court in Turoczi invites increased engagement with empirical legal scholarship of
the kind set out in this article. What makes this especially interesting is that once such
engagement begins, it is hard to know where it will end. If Turoczi is right, and reasonable
apprehension of bias can, in principle, be substantiated using expert evidence that outcomes
result from the identity of the adjudicator rather than the merits of the case, then courts can
expect litigants to increasingly seek out empirical evidence of inconsistent decision-making.
Moreover, this growth in demand for empirical legal research will occur during a period when
information about decision-making-and sophisticated new tools to assess such information-is
increasingly available in an era of big data. 139
137 Ibid at paras 4-5 (the court held that McBean was not in a position to determine what had in fact happened to the
claimant, and that as such it was an "overstatement" for McBean to hold that the incidents recounted by the claimant
"never actually occurred.").
138 Cervenakova v Canada (Ministerof Citizenship & Immigration), 2010 FC 1281 at paras 83-84, [2010] FCJ No
1591; Higbogun v Canada (MCI), 2010 FC 445 at paras 51-67, [2010 FCJ No 516; Lasab v Canada(MCI), 2015 FC
413 at para 13, 251 ACWS (3d) 654.
139 Consider, for example a recent study of over 150,000 US asylum determinations, which found that an
application's likelihood of success changed depending on whether prior cases decided by the adjudicator were
granted or refused - most likely because adjudicators underestimate the probability of streaks, leading them to adjust
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My sense is that courts would generally prefer avoiding increased engagement with
empirical legal scholarship about patterns of decision-making in the context of reasonable
apprehension of bias. Such engagement would force courts to grapple with difficult theoretical
questions about the nature of administrative decision-making and adjudication, including the
thorny relation between subjectivity, neutrality, and impartiality discussed above in the context
of R v S (RD).140 Simply put, the current case law on reasonable apprehension of bias is both
unsettled and unsettling; adding empirical legal scholarship to the mix is likely to make this area
of law even more difficult. Moreover, such engagement would inevitably spill over from the
refugee law and administrative decision-making contexts into other types of decision-making,
including adjudication in courts. It would also raise practical challenges, such as where to draw
the line in terms of an acceptable degree of subjectivity. Is there, for example, a reasonable
apprehension of bias when, due to the identity of the adjudicator, a refugee claimant's chance of
success decreases by one hundred percent, by fifty percent, by twenty percent, by five percent,
by one percent, by 0.1 percent?
However, courts cannot simply ignore persuasive empirical evidence where the outcomes
in high-stakes refugee adjudication hinge at least partly on the identity of the adjudicator rather
than the merits of the claims. This creates an opening, both for courts and for other institutions,
to consider mechanisms that could respond to inconsistent decision-making without necessarily
relying on reasonable apprehension of bias. These mechanisms will be examined next.
b. Mitigating the Impact of Inconsistent Decision-Making: Asymmetric Refugee
Procedures
An alternative way to think about the luck of the draw in refugee law decision-making is
to view this phenomenon as the norm in adjudication rather than as the exception. Some degree
of subjectivity is an unavoidable feature of adjudication. It is not surprising that outcomes in
adjudication turn in part on the identity of the adjudicator. Moreover, this subjectivity cannot be
mitigated through the doctrine of reasonable apprehension of bias. If adjudication inevitably
involves subjectivity, replacing one subjective adjudicator with another subjective adjudicator
will not reduce subjectivity in adjudication.
If one begins with the assumption that some degree of subjectivity in adjudication is
inevitable, then the key question to ask about high stakes adjudication is not how to eliminate
adjudicative subjectivity. Instead, it is necessary to consider how its pernicious effects can be
minimized. Asymmetric procedural rules are an especially promising way to do this. Such
asymmetries involve making policy choices about what type of outcomes are most important to
avoid, and then setting up rules that reduce the likelihood of those outcomes. Thus, for example,
in Canadian criminal law, there is a strong policy preference for minimizing false positives (i.e.
wrongful convictions) even at the expense of increasing false negatives (i.e. wrongful
their decision-making to avoid streaks. Daniel Chen, Tobias Moskovitz and Kelly Shue, "Decision-making Under
the Gambler's Fallacy: Evidence from Asylum Judges, Loan Officers and Baseball Umpires" (2016) Fama-Miller
Working Paper, available online: <http://ssm.com/abstract=2538147>. Or consider a similar study of 25,000 US
asylum determinations made the day after an NFL team played a game in the adjudicator's home town, which found
that adjudicators were more likely to grant asylum when the local team had won than when the team had lost; see
Daniel Chen, Tobias J Moskowitz & Kelly Shue ""Decision-making Under the Gambler's Fallacy: Evidence from
Asylum Judges, Loan Officers and Baseball Umpires" (2014) National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper No 22026, online: <www.nber.org/papers/w22026>.
140 Supra notes 97-102 (and accompanying
text).
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acquittals)."' Several asymmetric criminal law procedural rules give effect to this policy
preference. For instance, the Crown bears the burden of proof,14 2 the standard of proof for
conviction (beyond a reasonable doubt) is extremely demanding,143 and convictions require
unanimity among jurors.1" Similarly, the rules on when the Crown can appeal acquittals are
more restrictive than the rules regarding individuals seeking to appeal convictions.14 5
There are good reasons for a similar type of policy preference in the refugee law context
whereby false negatives (which can be understood from this perspective as refusing refugee
protection when most adjudicators would grant protection) should be minimized even if this
increases the likelihood of false positives (which can be understood as granting refugee
protection when most adjudicators would refuse protection). False-negative refugee
determinations may result in refugees being deported to face persecution, torture, or death. These
involve high stakes, comparable to the consequences of false convictions in the most serious
criminal proceedings. Moreover, false-negative refugee determinations not only have devastating
consequences for individual refugees, but they may also leave Canada in breach of international
refugee law.
To be sure, false positives may also have important consequences. For example, frequent
false positives may undermine the integrity of the Canadian immigration system and may
decrease public support for refugee programs. 14 6 However, these consequences are generally less
pressing than the comparable consequences of false acquittals in serious criminal proceedings.
Thus, the argument for asymmetric procedures is, if anything, more compelling in the refugee
law context than it would be in the criminal law context. Moreover, such a policy preference
would be in keeping with the basic objectives of Canadian refugee law, which, according to
Canadian immigration legislation, "is in the first instance about saving lives and offering
protection to the displaced and persecuted."
There are many procedures that could minimize false-negative refugee determinations in
light of empirical evidence about the luck of the draw in refugee adjudication. However,
Canada's refugee determination system does not currently operate in a manner that minimizes
such false negatives. McBean's decisions from 2008 to 2010 provide a good example of this
problem.
Consider, for example, that claimants whose cases were decided by McBean from 2008
to 2010 did not have access to an administrative appeal on the merits to the IRB's Refugee
Appeal Division (RAD). Since 2002, Canada's immigration legislation has included such an
appeal, at least on paper. However, the RAD was not actually implemented until Canada's
refugee determination system was revised in 2012. Additionally, when the appeal was finally
implemented, several groups of claimants were barred from accessing the RAD. These bars
included claimants from designated countries of origin (DCO bar), claims resulting in NCB
declarations (NCB bar), claims declared to be manifestly unfounded (MUC bar), claims by
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foreign nationals who transited to Canada via an exception in the Canada-US Safe Third Country
Agreement (Safe 3rd bar), and claims by designated foreign nationals (DFN bar)."'
Because of these limits, most claimants in McBean's decisions from 2008 to 2010 would
not have benefited from the appeal set out in Canada's revised refugee legislation. In fact, of the
172 McBean cases examined in the quantitative section of this paper, 149 (85.5%) would have
been denied access to the RAD due to the DCO and NCB bars alone.14 9 This reveals a serious
problem with the revised refugee legislation: one of the most significant outliers on the negative
side in refugee adjudication from 2008 to 2010 would be largely free from oversight in the
internal appeal at the RAD if McBean made exactly the same decisions under the revised system.
While this problem has been mitigated to some degree by a recent Federal Court case finding the
DCO bar unconstitutional,so the problem has not entirely been resolved. That is because even
without the DCO bar, seventy (40.7%) of McBean's 172 decisions during this period would be
covered by the NCB bar."'
Moreover, even if claimants whose cases were denied by McBean from 2008 to 2010 had
access to the RAD in its current form, it is not clear how this would have provided much
assistance. Due to the level of deference that may be shown by the RAD to first instance RPD
credibility determinations, as well as the deference paid to the type of decisions that McBean
made, it is unclear what help, if any, the RAD would have provided.
There is a growing body of jurisprudence on how the RAD should approach appeals of
RPD decisions. Initially, the RAD applied a highly deferential approach based on the
"reasonableness" standard of review as articulated in jurisprudence relating to judicial review of
administrative decision-making. 15 2 According to this standard of review, if a decision falls within
a range of acceptable outcomes and is justified in a transparent and intelligible manner, a
reviewing court will uphold the decision, even if the court would have come to a different
conclusion had it approached the case on a de novo basis.153 More recently, the Federal Court of
Appeal in Canadav Huruglica found that this approach is not applicable when the RAD hears
appeals from the RPD because the deferential reasonableness standard aims to govern the
relationship between the courts and administrative tribunals, whereas the RAD is an appellate
body within an administrative tribunal."' Instead, the Federal Court of Appeal found that the
RAD should assess RPD decisions on a standard of correctness, where there is no issue of
credibility of oral evidence.'-- The Federal Court of Appeal explicitly left it to the RAD to
develop its own jurisprudence on the degree of deference that it should afford the RPD in respect
of its credibility assessments, noting that this jurisprudence will need to develop on a case-by148

Ibid, s 110.

Of the 172 claims McBean decided, 24 would have been covered by the NCB bar, 79 would have been covered
by the DCO bar, and 46 would have been covered by both. The DCO figures are calculated based on countries
designated as of 15 October 2014. No data was available on whether any of the 172 claims would have been covered
by the safe third bar. However, it is likely that many would be, considering that 23.1% of claims referred to the IRB
in 2013 were covered by this bar; see Grant & Rehaag, supra note 93 at 46-48 (none of the 172 claims would have
been subject to the DFN or MUC bars as neither procedure existed at time the claims were decided).
15o Z(Y) v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2015 FC 892 at paras 183-184, [2015] FCJ No 880;
"Liberals end appeal of unconstitutional Tory refugee measure", The Globe and Mail (4 January 2016), online:
<www.theglobeandmail.com>.
151 For further discussion, see Grant & Rehaag, supra
note 93 at 261-264.
152 See e.g. X (Re), 2013 CanLIl 76473 (CA IRB) at paras 10-29.
153 Dunsmuirv New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 (CanLIl) at paras 43-64, [2008] 1 SCR 190.
154 Canada (CitizenshipandImmigration) v Huruglica,2016 FCA 93 (CanLlI) at para 47, [2016] FCJ No 313.
155 Ibid at para
103.
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case basis. 15 6 However the Federal Court of Appeal also noted that the level of deference owed in
particular cases should recognize "there may be cases where the RPD enjoys a meaningful
advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, because they require
an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to the oral evidence it hears.""'
While the general findings in Huruglicaregarding the correctness standard on matters of
law and mixed fact and law other than credibility are a step in the right direction, this last
passage is problematic in light of the case study of McBean's decision-making from 2008 to
2010. Recall that in 66.7% of these cases, McBean found claimants to be generally lacking in
credibility. What this suggests is that if the RAD defers to negative RPD credibility
determinations, then the RAD cannot serve to minimize false-negative refugee determinations
caused by outlier decision-makers who are prone to disbelieving claimants. If RAD is to serve as
a meaningful form of oversight to correct false-negative refugee decisions caused by such outlier
decision-makers, it is essential that the RAD avoid overly deferential standards of review for
negative RPD credibility determinations.1 58
A similar point can be made about judicial review. If claimants either cannot access the
RAD or if the RAD does not meaningfully reconsider negative credibility determinations, then
the only recourse available to correct false-negative refugee determinations resulting from this
sort of subjective first instance decision-making is judicial review in Federal Court. McBean's
decision-making from 2008 to 2010, however, reveals problems with the judicial review process.
Out of 166 McBean decisions during this period for which data is available, only eight were fully
reviewed by the Federal Court (4.8%). Moreover, when these decisions were considered, the
Federal Court adopted a deferential standard of review towards credibility findings
(reasonableness)15 9 ; as was previously noted, 66.7% of McBean's decisions involved negative
credibility determinations. Taken together, this means that Federal Court judicial review did not,
in the vast majority of cases, meaningfully reduce the risks of false-negative refugee
determinations caused by McBean's outlier decision-making from 2008 to 2010.
The current refugee determination system does not do a good job of limiting the most
pernicious aspects of subjectivity in refugee adjudication (i.e. false-negative determinations).
However, it would be a simple matter to bring in revisions that would dramatically enhance that
system.
One option would be to return to the pre-2002 practice whereby refugee claims were
heard by panels of two adjudicators, with differences in refugee claim outcomes between the
adjudicators being resolved in favor of the claimant. 160 Such a practice would mean that claims
could not be denied merely because of a single outlier decision-maker (though they could be
granted by a single outlier decision-maker). Moreover, this practice could actively mitigate the
harm caused by outlier decision-makers by matching them with more typical decision-makers. 16 1
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Ibid at para 74.
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15s There is cause for concern in this regard in a very recent post-HuruglicaFederal Court decision, which upheld
RAD's deference to RPD credibility determinations; see Gebremichael v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2016 FC 646 at para 14, 267 ACWS (3d) 670.
159 See Fernandez, supra note
134 at para 3.
160 Catherine Dauvergne, "Evaluating Canada's New Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in its Global Context"
(2003) 41:3 Alta L Rev 725 at 728 & 729.
161 Frangois Crepeau & Delphine Nakache, "Critical Spaces in the Canadian Refugee Determination System: 19892002" (2008) 20:1 Int J Refugee Law 50 at 85 (there is some evidence that this was precisely how the two-panel-
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Another option would be to rework the new appeal at the RAD to achieve similar effects.
For example, all claimants refused by the RPD could be provided with access to the RAD to
ensure that there is at least some substantive oversight of negative first instance RPD decisions.
Additionally, there could be restrictions preventing the government from appealing positive RPD
decisions. If the government cannot appeal positive decisions, then the RAD could review RPD
decisions on an entirely de novo basis that would show no deference to factual and credibility
findings made by the RPD. This would effectively replicate the pre-2002 practice whereby two
decision-makers would need to agree to deny a claim, whereas a single decision-maker could
grant a claim. Alternatively, if both claimants and the government could appeal RPD decisions,
then a more complex standard of intervention would need to be applied. That is because if both
positive and negative RPD decisions could be appealed and if the RAD heard appeals on an
entirely de novo basis then the system would have simply replicated the subjective adjudication
false-negative problem at a higher level. Instead of refugee claims hinging on the luck of the
draw at the RPD, they would hinge on the luck of the draw at the RAD.
If the RAD were accessible both to claimants and to the government then an asymmetric
standard of intervention is needed. One possible asymmetric standard would be for the RAD to
adopt a deferential approach to factual and credibility findings that assist the claimant, while
adopting a non-deferential approach to factual and credibility findings that disadvantage
claimants. Again, such a policy would essentially replicate the pre-2002 practice of having two
decision-makers hear claims, with differences between the decision-makers being resolved in
favour of the claimant.
These are only a few examples of possible policies that could mitigate the harms of
subjectivity in refugee adjudication. The point here is not that any particular policy should be
adopted. Rather, it is to argue that, if one begins with the assumption that inconsistent refugee
law decision-making is inevitable in light of unavoidable subjectivity in adjudication (or if one is
not prepared to remove outlier decision-makers through the doctrine of reasonable apprehension
of bias), then asymmetric procedures should be used to minimize the most serious impact of the
luck of the draw in high stakes refugee adjudication. 16 2
c. Taking Responsibility for Inconsistent Decision-Making: Good-Faith DecisionMakers
A third way of thinking about the luck of the draw in refugee adjudication is to ask what
all this looks like from the perspective of decision-makers, and specifically, from the perspective
of decision-makers who are trying their best to make fair and consistent refugee decisions.
Decision-makers seeking guidance in this area can look to a number of sources. These
include Federal Court case law, formal instruments used by the IRB to enhance consistency, and
informal mechanisms such as IRB training. 163 All these mechanisms can be helpful in enhancing
consistency by encouraging decision-makers to follow similar processes and to develop and
member panels were used by the IRB and it is also worth recalling that the only case from 2008 to 2010 in which
McBean explicitly found a claimant to be credible involved a panel of three members).
162 See also Hilary Evans Cameron, When in Doubt: The Law of Fact-Findingin Canadian Refugee Status (SJD
Thesis, University of Toronto, 2016) [unpublished] (for a more extended argument about the need for asymmetric
procedures - that is for preferring mechanisms that limit false negatives even at the expense of increasing false
positives).
163 For a discussion of means that the IRB has explored to enhance consistency in refugee adjudication, see Rehaag,
"Troubling", supranote 51 at 340.
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apply shared understandings of the refugee definition. In some cases, these mechanisms can also
usefully highlight problematic practices in credibility assessments. For example, documents
prepared by the IRB Legal Service do a good job summarizing the case law on credibility
determinations and offering helpful reminders about the many ways that credibility
determinations can go wrong. 164 Along similar lines, training from experts on sexual minority
refugee determinations has helped reduce (though not eliminate) some of the more egregious
reliance on LGBTQ stereotypes when the IRB assesses the veracity of a minority refugee
claimant's asserted sexual orientation. 165
What none of these mechanisms really do, however, is provide clear guidance about how
decision-makers can reliably determine when refugee claimants are telling the truth. The reason
for this is straightforward: There is simply no way to do this. That is, there are no procedures, no
instructions, and no formulas that would allow decision-makers-certainly those confronted with
the highly constrained refugee determination context-to reliably detect truth and falsehood. 166
It would be understandable if, from the perspective of decision-makers who are called
upon to make credibility determinations, such an observation seems unsatisfying. However, this
observation has an important implication that, if taken seriously, can improve refugee decisionmaking. Indeed, this observation can help identify not only the main problem evident in the case
study of McBean's decision-making from 2008 to 2010, but also the most promising solution.
In finding this solution, a proper starting point can be found in the work of Audrey
Macklin. 167 Reflecting on her experience as an IRB Member, Macklin examines how refugee
decision-makers who want to make good quality decisions should approach credibility
determinations. 168 She runs through the various means typically used by IRB Members to assess
credibility-including consistency, plausibility and demeanour-and argues that none of these
allow adjudicators to effectively distinguish truth from falsehood. 169 This leads her to suggest
that, "[m]y tenure as a decision maker has taught me that if there is an objective reality out there,
I'm unlikely to discern it except incidentally."17 In other words, there is, according to Macklin,
no mechanism that refugee adjudicators could use to reliably and consistently assess credibility.
However, Macklin does not stop there. Instead, she suggests that adjudicators have
something to gain once they realize "that it is a mistake to overestimate our own capacity to
distinguish truth from falsehood, fact from fiction."17 ' This realization leads to the insight that
"credibility determination is not about 'discovering' truth. It is, rather, about making choiceswhat to accept, what to reject, how much to believe, where to draw the line-in the face of

164 See also Immigration and Refugee Board, Assessment of Credibilityin Claimsfor Refugee Protection,31 January
2004
(Ottawa:
Refugee
Protection
Division,
2004),
online:
<http://www.irb-

cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/references/LegJur/Documents/Credibe.pdf>.
165 See also Nicole LaViolette, "Overcoming Problems with Sexual Minority Refugee Claims: Is LGBT Cultural
Competency Training the Solution?" in Thomas Spijkerboer, ed., FleeingHomophobia. Sexual Orientation, Gender
Identity andAsylum (Oxon, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Books, 2013) 189 (for a discussion of the potential
and limits of training in this area).
166

Hilary Evans Cameron, "Substantial deference and tribunal expertise post-Dunsmuir: A new approach to

reasonableness review" (2014) 27:1 Can J Admin L & Practice 1 at 17-18 (for a similar argument, including
references to social scientific evidence to bolster this argument).
167 Macklin, "Truth" supra note 38 at 134.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid at 137-139.
17 0
Ibid at 139.
171 Ibid at 140.
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empirical uncertainty."17 If credibility determinations are about choices, then refugee
adjudicators who want to make good quality decisions need to be thoughtful about these choices
and to examine why they make particular choices. As Macklin puts it, making good quality
credibility determinations "requires [of decision-makers] that we do not confine ourselves to
interrogating the claimant, but that we also interrogate ourselves."
If one examines McBean's decision-making from 2008 to 2010 through this lens, then the
biggest problem is not just that McBean is much more likely than his colleagues to deny refugee
claims. Nor is it that he so frequently disbelieves claimants. Rather, it is that the reasons he
offered for disbelieving claimants do not seem to have much to do with the actual reasons why
he found claimants not to be credible. If one wanted to know why a claimant who appears before
McBean is found not to be credible one has to go beyond the reasons offered. That is because, as
the case study has shown, it is likely that, on the exact same facts, at least some of the claimants
who were disbelieved by McBean would have been believed by at least some other refugee
adjudicators. In other words, the claimant's credibility is not something that can be attributed
merely to the claimant; adjudicators also play a key role. If adjudicators play a key role, but they
write reasons that do not say anything about that role, then the reasons provided do not reflect the
actual reasons for the decision. In Macklin's terms, the reasons do not interrogate or explain the
adjudicator's choices. Rather, the reasons obscure those choices.
This also points to the most promising solution to the problems, which is evident in
McBean's decisions from 2008 to 2010: Decision-makers should not merely ask themselves
whether they have been persuaded by the claimant's evidence. They should also ask themselves
whether any of their colleagues would reasonably have been persuaded by the claimant's
evidence, including colleagues who are much more likely to grant refugee protection. If a
decision-maker personally disbelieves the claimant but is nonetheless of the view that at least
one colleague would reasonably believe the claimant then, absent unusual circumstances, the
decision-maker should take the claimant's evidence to be true.173 And if there are unusual
circumstances, such that the decision-maker wants to find the claimant's evidence not to be
credible despite acknowledging that another decision-maker would reasonably believe that
evidence, then the decision-maker should explain why.
Such an approach would accomplish two things simultaneously. First, it would force
decision-makers to articulate and interrogate their choices about "where to draw the line ... in
the face of empirical uncertainty.""' If adjudicators have to explain why their judgment differs
from that of their colleagues, it would ensure that, at a minimum, these differences are better
understood-and in doing so, this would facilitate oversight either on appeal at the RAD or on
judicial review in the Federal Court. Second, it would make it more difficult for decision-makers
to deny claims based on credibility. Such denials would generally only occur in the clearest
cases. This would reduce the luck of the draw and increase fairness, while limiting the likelihood
of false-negative decisions, which, as we saw in the prior section, is a key way to mitigate the
most pernicious effects of the luck of the draw in refugee adjudication.
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See generally Michael Kagan, "Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee
Status Determination" (2003) 17:3 Geo Immigr U 367-415 (this could be understood as an "objective" rather than
"subjective" test for credibility. That is, the adjudicator is not asking whether she or he believes the claimant, but
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This approach essentially requires humility and self-reflection among refugee
adjudicators. It requires that adjudicators approach their task not with the aim of preparing
written reasons that will withstand legal challenge (i.e. not to merely set out the legal authority
for their decision) but rather to make good-faith efforts to explain their decisions, including the
role that they as decision-makers play in their decisions, as well as to facilitate appeals or
reviews of their decisions. This is admittedly quite demanding-particularly in a context where
decision-makers are under enormous pressure to decide large numbers of cases quickly. This is
what is required of good-faith decision-makers who seriously consider research related to the
luck of the draw-including the findings of this case study-and the incredibly high stakes of the
decisions they are being asked to make.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article seeks to contribute to the growing body of scholarship about credibility
determinations in refugee adjudication. It does so through the case study of a single outlier
decision-maker at the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board. The case study shows that,
over a three-year period, this decision-maker was much more likely than his colleagues to deny
refugee claims from similar countries. The study also demonstrates that this decision-maker
frequently found that refugee claimants who appeared before him were liars and frauds. He
simply did not believe them.
The article also sets out several implications of the study, including in the areas of
reasonable apprehension of bias, institutional design, and approaches to credibility decisionmaking. But perhaps the most important implication of the study is this: More research is needed
for how refugee adjudicators make credibility determinations, particularly research that engages
from a variety of perspectives with social scientific methods, and research that offers practical
suggestions using insights drawn from those methods. As was argued, credibility determinations
are the key to many, if not most, refugee decisions. Those who conduct research on refugee law
issues, as well as those who are involved in refugee decision-making as adjudicators,
administrators or policy makers, need a much better understanding of how such determinations
are, can, and should be made.
Finally, I would like to conclude on a personal note. I struggled with writing this article,
which has been percolating for several years now. The challenge for me was not in conducting
the research. Rather, the challenge was in thinking through what I wanted to learn from the
research-why some possible lessons mattered more to me than others. I wondered, as I was
writing, whether I simply believe refugee claimants, and, if so, whether that is as much of a
problem as simply not believing them. I wondered whether the research, which uses the language
and methods of empirical legal studies, might be advocacy for refugees in disguise (and if so,
whether this is a problem). I wondered whether quantitative research of this kind oversimplifies
complex social phenomena. I wondered whether latching onto inconsistencies in refugee
determination statistics is like being preoccupied with inconsistencies between dates in a
claimant's testimony and whether such preoccupations may do more to obscure than to clarify.
And I wondered whether there was something unfair about using public resources and a
privileged position as a tenured law professor to publish a critique of a (now former) refugee
adjudicator.
I continue to wonder about all of this. But, ultimately, I think the best answer to these
sorts of questions is to set out the research as fairly as I can and then to hope that others take up
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my call to conduct further research, including research that might expose some of the limits of
this case study and of the implications that I have sought to draw from it.
VI.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX: Outcomes in Principal Applicant Claims: McBean v All RPD Members, per Country of Origin* (2008-2010)
McBean
Country

Positive

Negative

NCB

Mexico
0
82
is
0
11
Portugal
8
Poland
0
8
4
Trinidad and Tobago
0
8
6
Czech Republic
0
6
1
Philippines
0
6
5
Saint Vincent
0
6
6
El Salvador
0
4
2
Germany
0
4
4
Guyana
0
4
0
Italy
0
4
4
Grenada
0
3
1
Guatemala
0
3
1
Saint Lucia
0
3
2
Hungary
0
2
1
2
2
Peru
0
Sweden
0
2
1
0
1
0
Barbados
Belize
0
1
0
0
1
1
Bolivia
Brazil
0
1
0
0
1
1
Costa Rica
Dominica
0
1
1
0
1
0
France
Ireland
0
1
1
Jamaica
0
1
0
Netherlands
0
1
1
Norway
0
1
1
Spain
0
1
0
USA
0
1
1
Venezuela
0
1
0
Source: IRB ATIP A-2013-10523 (4 Apil2013)
*Only countries from which McBean decided at least one case

All RPD
Total
82
11
8
8
6
6
6
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Recognitio
Rate (%)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

NCBR (%)

Positive

Negative

NCB

Total

18.3
72.7
50.0
75.0
16.7
83.3
100.0
50.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
33.3
33.3
66.7
50.0
100.0
50.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
1000
100.0
0.0
100.0
0.0

771
0
30
31
60
31
341
166
0
45
0
21
97
135
19
90
0
11
1
19
15
3
2
1
0
101
0
0
0
1
76

5279
33
56
101
111
176
536
351
24
147
12
50
175
239
59
125
5
32
6
11
74
26
7
23
2
175
10
1
11
691
57

285
14
10
15
9
16
48
11
4
8
5
2
8
25
7
3
1
4
0
1
9
2
1
3
1
16
1
1
1
14
2

6050
33
86
132
171
207
877
517
24
192
12
71
272
374
78
215
5
43
7
30
89
29
9
24
2
276
10
1
11
692
133

Recognition
Rate (%)
12.7
0.0
34.9
23.5
35.1
15.0
38.9
32.1
0.0
23.4
0.0
29.6
35.7
36.1
24.4
41.9
0.0
25.6
14.3
63.3
16.9
10.3
22.2
4.2
0.0
36.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
57.1

CR (%)
4.7
42.4
11.6
11.4
5.3
7.7
5.5
2.1
16.7
4.2
41.7
2.8
2.9
6.7
9.0
1.4
20.0
9.3
0.0
3.3
10.1
6.9
11.1
12.5
50.0
5.8
10,0
100.0
9.1
2.0
1.5

